Reports 1–3 measured the central budget's debt service and the assets sold or licensed away. This report measures the second channel of resource loss: municipalities, where urban services are actually produced, finance those services mainly with debt — in the metropolitan areas, FX debt — while the value the debt creates (land rent, zoning gains, operating income, contractor payments) accrues to the market rather than the municipality. The pattern above ground mirrors the pattern below ground: the public sector produces, borrows and does not share in the uplift.
| Year | Expenditure ₺bn | Revenue ₺bn | Debt stock ₺bn | Debt stock $bn | Debt / revenue |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2010 | 47≈ | 43≈ | 33≈ | 22 | 77% |
| 2014 | 88≈ | 79≈ | 55≈ | 25 | 70% |
| 2017 | 148 | 128 | 108 | 30 | 84% |
| 2020 | 232≈ | 205≈ | 210≈ | 30 | 102% |
| 2022 | 480 | 450 | 350 | 21 | 78% |
| 2024 | 1,500≈ | 1,400≈ | 780≈ | 24 | 56% |
| 2025 | 2,250≈ | 2,100≈ | 1,100≈ | 28 | 52% |
| Channel | Terms | Security / deduction | Result |
|---|---|---|---|
| İller Bankası loans | TL, 5–15 years; ₺29.7 bn in 2024; bank profit ₺17.2 bn | Deducted at source from the tax share | Cheap but small; the bank profits, the municipality's share shrinks |
| Treasury-guaranteed foreign loans | Investment only; EUR/USD, 10–20 yrs; EBRD, EIB, AIIB, World Bank, JBIC — the main source for metro and treatment plants | Treasury pays on default and recovers from the tax share; local governments are the Treasury's largest debtor group (₺10.6 bn, 2023) | FX risk on the municipality; deduction from the citizen's share |
| Commercial bank loans (TL) | Short-term, 45–60% in 2024–25 | Revenue assignment, property mortgage | Most expensive channel |
| Tax and social-security arrears | De facto borrowing; restructuring laws 2011–2023 (36–120 month instalments) | Deducted from the tax share; property transfer (IMM 2025: 23 properties) | "Amnesty" cycle; debt paid with the city's assets |
| Contractor and company payables | Delayed progress payments; 565,000 staff in municipal companies (2022) | None; de facto forced trade credit | Implicit interest to contractors |
Four mechanisms move value to the private sector: (1) transport investment → land rent (a metro corridor lifts property values 10–30%; IMM is building ten lines at once with ₺155 bn for transport in 2026; the 2020 betterment levy applies only to plan changes); (2) zoning rights → construction rent; (3) transfer of services to private operators (private buses, parking, advertising); (4) contractor and municipal-company payments. Rough measure for Istanbul: ≈ $8–10 bn of metro investment generating ≈ $20–30 bn of private value uplift on ≈ $150–200 bn of corridor property — two to three times the investment, with the municipality's share close to zero. Hong Kong MTR, Seoul's development levy and London Crossrail's business-rate supplement (£4.1 bn) show the share can be captured.
| Metric | Istanbul (IMM) | Seoul (SMG) | Chile (central state) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Population | ≈ 15.7 m (18% of Türkiye) | ≈ 9.4 m (18% of Korea) | ≈ 20 m |
| Output | ≈ $400 bn (≈ 30% of Türkiye) | ≈ $400 bn (≈ 23% of Korea) | ≈ $330 bn |
| Budget | ₺609 bn ≈ $13 bn (2026); with districts ≈ $18–20 bn | ≈ 48 tn won ≈ $33–35 bn | ≈ $90–100 bn |
| Budget / output | ≈ 3–4% (≈ 5% with districts) | ≈ 8–9% | ≈ 27–30% |
| Debt | $3.8 bn, mostly FX | ≈ $8 bn, all won, municipal bonds; 20% ceiling | Public debt ≈ 42% GDP, balanced currencies |
| Metro finance | IMM FX loans + ministry budget; no land value capture | National contribution + Seoul bonds + development levy; Seoul Metro public company | Metro S.A. public company; state capital + bonds |
| Property tax | ≈ 0.3% GDP; assessed values far below market | ≈ 1% GDP + comprehensive real-estate tax | ≈ 1% GDP |
Seoul runs 2.5 times Istanbul's budget with 60% of its population — not from spending appetite but revenue design. Istanbul manages an economy larger than Chile's with a fifth of Chile's state budget. Istanbul's fiscal problem is not the size of its debt ($3.8 bn is 1% of its output); it is that even this small debt is repaid from the centre's share, not the city's revenue, and that none of the rent the city creates enters its budget.
| Revenue source | Now | Potential (national, annual) | Precedent |
|---|---|---|---|
| Property tax at market value | ≈ 0.3% GDP (≈ ₺220 bn) | 1% GDP = ≈ ₺750 bn (≈ $16 bn); primary-residence exemption, phased | OECD ≈ 1.9%; Korea, Chile ≈ 1% |
| Transport-corridor value capture | None | 15–20% of ≈ $20–30 bn Istanbul uplift = $3–6 bn one-off; ≈ $5–8 bn nationally | Hong Kong MTR; Crossrail; Seoul |
| Sale of development rights / wider betterment levy | Partial (Law 7221, 2020) | ≈ ₺100–200 bn | São Paulo CEPAC |
| Local-currency municipal bonds | 2012 regulation unused | Replace FX loans; eliminate currency losses; TVF/İller Bankası-guaranteed "Istanbul Infrastructure Bond" for pension and insurance funds | Seoul, Tokyo, US munis |
| Recovering service operating margins | Private buses, parking, advertising margins private | 3–5% of metropolitan revenue | Seoul Metro, TfL |
| Total potential | ≈ ₺1–1.2 tn (≈ $25 bn) a year + ≈ $5–8 bn one-off — close to the entire local debt stock |
Sources: General Directorate of Accounting local government budget statistics 2006–2025; Treasury Public Debt Management Reports; İller Bankası 2024 Annual Report; IMM 2023–2025 budgets and 2026 budget presentation (Nov 2025); Ministry of Labour statements on municipal social-security arrears (2024–25); Laws 5393, 5779, 4749, 2464, 1319, 7221, 5510; TurkStat provincial GDP (2023); Seoul Metropolitan Government budget and debt disclosures; Chile Dipres; OECD Revenue Statistics; ITDP and Lincoln Institute land-value-capture literature; TfL Crossrail funding report. Series marked "≈" must be replaced with the consolidated official tables before decisions.